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Equitable subrogation award among coowners: 
Kenney v U.S., 2006 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
On sale of house, equitable subrogation award was to be calculated by crediting all of joint 
tenant’s mortgage payments against net proceeds before dividing balance into equal shares. 
Kenney v U.S. (9th Cir 2006) 458 F3d 1025 
George Kenney (Kenney) and his former wife, Donna, held title as joint tenants on a house 
they purchased in 1978. They permanently separated in 1989. By oral agreement with Donna, 
from 1989 until the house was sold in 2002, Kenney assumed and made all the payments on the 
house loans, a total of $166,826 in principal and iterest. Between 1995 and 1997, the 
government filed tax liens against Donna. Donna quitclaimed her interest in the house to 
Kenney; thereafter, to sell the house, Kenney enterd into a substitution-of-proceeds agreement, 
agreeing that the liens would attach to the sale proceeds to the same extent as to the house itself. 
The net proceeds on sale of the house were $307,244. The government asserted liens against 
one half of those proceeds. Kenney sued to quiet titl  in the sale proceeds. The parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment. Kenney contended that because of his mortgage 
payments, under the oral agreements with Donna, Donna’s interest in the house (and thus her 
proceeds) had diminished to zero when the government’s liens attached. Alternately, Kenney 
contended that he was entitled to equitable subrogation gainst Donna’s interest for the payments 
he had made on Donna’s share as well as interest on the payments. The government agreed 
Kenney was entitled to equitable subrogation, but disagreed about its method of calculation and 
denied he was entitled to interest on the payments. The district court rejected Kenney’s 
diminishing interest theory. However, it adopted Kenn y’s calculation of equitable subrogation, 
but did not include interest on his payments. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The diminishing interest theory was 
foreclosed by Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 C4th 1096, 32 CR3d 471, reported in 28 CEB 
RPLR 190 (Nov. 2005), which required agreements to assume loan obligations to be in writing. 
The district court had divided the net proceeds ($307,244) into equal shares for Kenney and 
Donna, and applied equitable subrogation to credit Kenney half of the mortgage payments he 
made between 1989 and 2002 ($83,413) from Donna’s share. The remainder of Donna’s share 
($70,209) was available to satisfy the government li s. 
The government argued that Kenney’s $83,413 should be taken from the total net proceeds, 
leaving a balance to divide between Kenney and Donna, of which Donna’s half ($111,915.50) 
would be available to satisfy the liens. The governme t contended that because equitable 
subrogation only allowed Kenney to stand in the shoe  f the lenders, he should be paid from the 
net proceeds as a lender, before his and Donna’s shres were divided. 
The government’s method would have forced Kenney to take his subrogation award from 
proceeds in which he had a half interest, effectively forcing him to pay for half of the amount to 
which he was entitled. Several California cases establi hed that Kenney should be credited from 
the total net proceeds for all the principal and interest payments that he made ($166,826) before 
the balance was equally divided. 
The district court reached the correct result in its calculation, but it erred in giving the 
government all of the escrow interest on Donna’s share of the net proceeds. Kenney’s award of 
$83,413 was 54 percent of the $153,622 in controversy, so he should have received 54 percent of 
the escrow interest on the $153,622. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying interest on the payments Kenney 
made for Donna. It was free to consider that Kenney’s payments on Donna’s behalf enabled him 
to protect his own half interest in property, and that the property had appreciated. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Kenney had three theories to support his claim that his payment of 
Donna’s share of the mortgage should give him priority over the tax liens held by the 
government, but only the weakest one worked.  
The best theory (i.e., best for him) was “diminishing interest”—that half o  every 
payment he made on their joint mortgage worked a partial, proportional transfer of Donna’s 
equity in the security. (He might have made that theory even more lucrative by claiming 
only half the payments on the first mortgage, but 100 percent of his payments on the second 
mortgage, because those funds went entirely to Donna, but perhaps he was concerned about 
looking too greedy.) This theory lost only on a statute of frauds ground, which means that it 
can be much bolstered in future cases: If you fear th t your client’s spouse’s creditors may 
come after the shared assets, have the parties execut  a joint agreement that any excess 
payments by your client are partial purchases rathe than loans. (I proposed a variation of 
that arrangement some years ago for spouses to execut  mutual deeds of trust to protect 
recovery for excess contributions from creditors in Bernhardt, Secretly Severing Joint 
Tenancies, 19 CEB RPLR 125 (May 1996); either one should work.) This gets more 
complicated when title is held as community property rather than in joint tenancy, since 
some creditors of either spouse can then reach the entire asset and not just the share of one 
of them.  
The next best theory was to credit Kenney both for what he paid and also for interest on 
those payments. (That would have been a handsome amount, being calculated from the date 
each payment was made.) The court rejected that theory on the ground that the interest 
wasn’t equitably, and I think it was probably also n t economically, required: A junior 
creditor should be subordinate to the same existing enior liens whether they were still held 
by the original lenders or paid off by Kenney. (It also looks like Kenney got credit for the 
full amount of each mortgage payment, not just for h w much it reduced principal, which 
may or may not be a windfall, since the liens themslves accrued additional interest each 
month when not paid.) Unlike the first theory, this one is unlikely to be made any stronger 
because of an agreement between the spouses concerning it: The United States would have 
to sign the agreement, too. 
 Finally, the theory accepted by the court was that Kenney should have subrogation rights 
for the payments he made on the senior liens against the property that Donna and he owned 
that was subject to levy by the government for her debts. That was obviously fair, since his 
paying off those mortgages increased Donna’s equity, and therefore the amount the 
government could reach. (And, of course, fairness would have it come off the top rather that 
out of Kenney’s own share, as the government contended.) But, with regard to that theory, 
Kenney was lucky in two respects: First, that he had p id off the mortgages in full, since 
subrogation does not work for only partial payments. This rule does not seem particularly 
just, since partial reductions of principal on senior liens still benefit junior creditors, but any 
other rule has too many complications. (That consideration makes Kenney’s first theory—of 
diminishing interest—much more attractive, and essential, since the mortgage has been only 
partially paid.) Second, Kenney apparently was not aware of the government’s tax liens 
when he paid the mortgages, since knowledge can kill the right to subrogation. While this 
rule seems based more on a confusion between torts and property principles rather than on 
economic logic, it is the rule and can cause real harm to those who too readily agree to pay 
other’s debts. See Bernhardt, Paying the Wrong Debt, 19 CEB RPLR 212 (Oct. 1996). If 
your client does know of tax liens against his spouse, don’t make those mortgage payments 
too readily.—Roger Bernhardt 
 
